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 Introduction
In recent years, Europe has retained its position as the third largest global 
market for crowdfunding. Similar to other regional markets, it is domi-
nated by a single country accounting for the majority of related volumes, 
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namely the UK. Overall, European crowdfunding volumes were esti-
mated at USD 18 billion in 2018, growing 51% from an estimated vol-
ume of 11.9 billion in 2017 (Ziegler et  al. 2020). However, the UK 
accounted for 10.4 billion in 2018, while growing 30% from the USD 8 
billion it recorded in 2017. Accordingly, mainland Europe (including 44 
countries) has exhibited a dramatic growth of 95% from a total volume 
of 3.9 billion in 2017 to 7.6 billion in 2018.
Several intriguing features characterize crowdfunding in Europe, 
which essentially capture different facets of the market fragmentation. 
First, in global comparison, the UK, as the leading regional market, 
accounts for a smaller proportion of regional volumes (58% in 2018) 
than the US does in the Americas (96% in 2018) or China in the Asia 
Pacific region (97% in 2018). In Europe, a wider distribution of vol-
umes across national markets is evident with the Netherlands, 
Germany, and France as dominant players. Other countries with large 
volumes, such as Italy, Spain, or Poland, Sweden, Italy, or Belgium are 
following closely.
Second, cross-border transactions are limited, and usually associated 
with non-investment models like reward and donation crowdfunding, 
where regulatory barriers are minimal. However, Europe has thus far 
failed to produce a European equivalent to global US-based platforms in 
these spheres (e.g. Kickstarter, Indiegogo, or GoFundMe) with relevant 
platforms maintaining local focus and anchoring, while competing with 
the US-based actors on localized features and services (e.g. language, pay-
ment systems, customer support, currency). Moreover, most platforms 
operating investment models, as in equity-based and debt-based crowd-
funding, operate only in one country, partially due to the fragmented 
regulatory landscape within Europe. However, most European countries 
represent relatively small domestic markets, where local platforms may 
struggle to achieve sufficient scale towards profitability without interna-
tional reach.
Against this backdrop, the European Union has created a unified 
crowdfunding regulation for equity- and lending-based crowdfunding 
(European Commission 2018c; European Parliament 2019). The ambi-
tion of the European Crowdfunding Service Provider (hereafter ‘ECSP’) 
Regime has been to improve access to finance for SMEs across Europe, 
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while paving the way towards fewer limitations on cross-border invest-
ment activity within the continent. During the deliberation and negotia-
tion process, the proposal morphed from a so-called opt-in regime to a 
binding regime for platforms in all member states, constituting a possible 
source of harmonization and thus reduction of fragmentation in the mar-
ket starting in 2021, when the regime will come into force.
This chapter’s structure is as follows. In the coming section, we first 
present the current state of crowdfunding markets in Europe, especially 
with regards to differences between national markets. Next, the principles 
of the ECSP Regime proposal are presented, and expectations about its 
impact are outlined. These discussions are supported by insights from 
research conducted in European countries. We conclude this chapter 
with a list of suggestions for further research, as well as implications for 
practitioners in the region.
 The Current State of the European 
Crowdfunding Market
In the current section we present the state of European crowdfunding 
market. Unless otherwise stated, all data presented are adopted from the 
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance (hereafter ‘CCAF’) Global 
Alternative Finance Report (Ziegler et al. 2020) and the Fourth Annual 
European Alternative Finance Report (Ziegler et al. 2019).
In 2017, 597 European platforms have overseen a market turnover of 
USD 10.4 billion. In 2018, these figures have grown to 794 platforms 
overseeing a market volume of USD 18 billion. The majority of plat-
forms are concentrated in the relatively larger Western European econo-
mies of the UK (89 platforms), Germany (63 platforms), France (51 
platforms), Italy (51 platforms), the Netherlands (45 platforms) and 
Spain (39 platforms), with a majority of which domestically based. On 
the other end, Southern and Eastern European countries were served by 
less than 10 platforms, most of which were foreign-based. Some explana-
tions for this may be found in a study by Dushnitsky et al. (2016), who 
examined the conditions associated with platform creation at the national 
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level during the early years of the European crowdfunding industry 
(2008–2014). This study showed that platforms are more likely to be cre-
ated in countries characterized by larger market sizes (in terms of popula-
tion), higher entrepreneurship rates (in terms of share of population 
owning a new business), as well as where traditional financial institutions 
are involved (in terms of percentage of active platforms operated by 
established financial organizations) providing the new industry with a 
degree of legitimacy.
Three European countries have seen volumes surpassing the USD 1 
billion mark including the UK (USD 10.4 billion), the Netherlands 
(USD 1.8 billion), and Germany (USD 1.2 billion), with France closely 
approaching this threshold with USD 933 million in 2018. 
Furthermore, from a regional perspective, despite relatively small domes-
tic markets, the Nordic and Baltic States have exhibited strong growth. 
Here, regional volumes showed that the Nordics (Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden) accounted for USD 507 million in 2017 
and USD 824 million in 2018, mostly led by Finland (USD 379 million) 
and Sweden (USD 298 million). The Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania) accounted for USD 265 million in 2017 and USD 539 mil-
lion in 2018, with Latvia (USD 254 million) taking lead. Other notable 
regional leaders include Poland in Eastern Europe with USD 333 million 
and Spain in the Iberian Peninsula with USD 419 million. However, 
when controlling for market size, highest volumes per capita were 
recorded in the UK with USD 156, Latvia with USD 132, Estonia USD 
121, and the Netherlands with USD 105 in 2018.
The fragmentation of crowdfunding markets in Europe can be grasped 
by distinguishing several categories of crowdfunding markets: (1) Market 
leaders—countries with a large crowdfunding volume, a few dozen plat-
forms, and high volumes per capita (e.g. UK, Netherlands); (2) Domestic- 
growth markets—countries with a large crowdfunding volume, a few 
dozen platforms, but low volume per capita mostly driven by domestic 
transactions (e.g. Germany, France); (3) International-growth markets—
countries with small crowdfunding volumes, less than 20 platforms but 
high volume per capita mostly driven by international transactions (e.g. 
Estonia, Latvia); and (4) Slow international adapters—countries with 
small crowdfunding volumes, less than 20 platforms, and small volume 
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per capita mostly driven by international transactions (e.g. countries in 
Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe) (Fig. 16.1).
When plotting per capita volumes against GDP per capita (Fig. 16.1), 
as indicator of economic development, the results suggest that volumes in 
countries such as the UK, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Georgia indi-
cate an efficient utilization of the alternative finance models, whereas 
countries like Cyprus, Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Luxembourg underutilized their alternative finance potential.
High volumes of P2P Consumer and Business Lending activities are 
associated with higher performance of a country (i.e. UK, Georgia, 
Latvia, and Estonia), while countries with high volumes of reward-based 
or donation-based crowdfunding are associated with relative underper-
formance of a country (i.e. Norway, Iceland, Malta, Greece, Luxembourg). 
This usually reflects regulatory regimes enabling investment crowdfund-
ing versus regulatory environments in which this is constrained by exist-
ing laws, as well as where changes were made very close to data collection 
period. As a result, the underperformance of countries with large sectors 
of non-investment crowdfunding is caused by the fact that contributions 
per project per person are lower in the donation-based and reward-based 






























































Fig. 16.1 Alternative finance volume per capita versus GDP per capita 2017. 
(Source: Ziegler et al. 2019)
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The fragmentation is not only evidenced by the market volumes, but 
also by their distribution. It is instructive to observe which European 
countries represent the top three performing markets by volumes accord-
ing to each crowdfunding model. In 2018, the UK took the top position 
in 10 of the 13 business models covered by the CCAF report. Germany 
took the top position in real estate crowdfunding and donation-based 
crowdfunding, as well as second position in P2P consumer and P2P busi-
ness lending. And the Netherlands had the largest market for balance 
sheet property lending, while taking second place in the balance sheet 
business lending, debt-based securities, as well as the revenue sharing 
models. Other market leaders include those taking second place, such as 
Denmark in P2P property lending, Sweden in balance sheet consumer 
lending, Finland in equity crowdfunding, Italy in invoice trading, and 
France in reward crowdfunding.
Finally, a different insight into fragmentation in Europe is evident in a 
recent study by Rossi and Vismara (2018), who analysed services offered 
by 124 investment crowdfunding platforms from the UK, France, 
Germany, and Italy. First, they find that platforms offer relatively few 
services before, during, and after the campaign, and even these vary 
widely by platforms. The few exceptions offered by a majority of plat-
forms include the facilitation of interaction and period campaign updates. 
Second, the study also showed that the average annual number of suc-
cessful campaigns were substantially higher in the UK and France versus 
those in Germany and Italy. Furthermore, the authors found that plat-
forms offering a higher number of post-campaign services were associated 
with higher number of successful campaigns, while the number of ser-
vices offered before and during campaigns were not associated with 
higher levels of success.
 Traditional Financial Institutions in European 
Crowdfunding Markets
Fragmentation in the European markets is also evident with respect to 
relations of platforms with institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, 
asset management firms, banks). In continental Europe in 2017 (i.e. 
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excluding the UK), USD 511 million (13%) originated from institu-
tional investors, increasing in both relative and absolute size to USD 1.1 
billion (14.5%) in 2018. In 2018, these volumes reach USD 4.88 billion 
(47%). Some markets are heavily dependent on institutional investors, 
including Italy with 90%, the Benelux region with 88%, and Germany 
with 64% of the 2018 volumes coming from institutional investors. On 
the other side of the spectrum, institutional investors were associated 
with only 2% of volumes in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent 
States) and 5% of volumes in Eastern and Baltic European countries 
in 2018.
Beyond the provision of funding to alternative finance offerings, insti-
tutional engagement with platforms is sometimes also evident with 
respect to organizational relations. Here, platform ownership by institu-
tional partners is evident among 15–20% of platforms operating in 
Western Europe, but only among 4–8% of platforms operating in Baltic, 
Central, and South-East Europe in 2017. No platform in Eastern Europe 
and the CIS was owned by institutional partners in 2017.
 International Scope of European Platform Operations
Data collected annually by the CCAF suggests that cross-border transac-
tions and internationalization of platforms is on the rise in Europe. In 
2017, 77% of platforms had seen cross-border inflows to local platforms, 
44% of platforms saw cross-border outflows. Here, again, fragmentation 
is evident across Europe, where some regions are home to more interna-
tionally oriented platforms, while other regions are characterized by more 
domestic-facing platforms. In 2017, CIS countries, Georgia, Baltics, and 
Eastern European countries reported a high level of cross-border flows. 
Iberia, South-Eastern European countries, Ireland, Central European 
countries, and the Benelux countries showed a medium level of cross- 
border flows. Nordic countries, Germany, and France showed relatively 
low levels of cross-border flows. This is presented in Fig. 16.2.












































Fig. 16.2 Cross-border flows in European crowdfunding markets 2017. (Source: 
Ziegler et al. 2019)
These findings are especially relevant for the discussion of the ECSP 
Regime. According to our market classification suggested above, Market 
Leaders and Domestic-growth Markets incorporate a majority of domestic 
platforms first achieving a degree of scale operations domestically, and 
then engaging in cautious and limited international expansion. 
International-growth Markets include platforms that emerge from rela-
tively small home markets, leveraging relatively permissive regulatory 
frameworks, while more aggressively expanding into other country mar-
kets for achieving scale, sustainability, and growth. Finally Slow 
International Adapters represent countries, where, despite scale potentiali-
ties, growth is constrained by lagging regulatory amendments as well as 
lower levels of social trust (Delhey and Newton 2005) and suspicion 
towards digital financial innovations. Here, platforms attempt tapping 
into international support to achieve legitimacy in the domestic markets, 
where international funding triggers domestic development and 
acceptance.
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 Regulation and European Crowdfunding 
Market Fragmentation
Thus far, a number of areas in which disparity is evident within the 
European crowdfunding market have been listed including volumes per 
country and per capita, number of platforms, model diversity, and extent 
of dependency on cross-border transactions and flows. In the current sec-
tion we will explore aspects of fragmentation with respect to regulations 
and their impact on a European-level market for crowdfunding. Ever 
since the first report mapping the conditions and prospects of crowd-
funding in Europe, regulation was identified as a key pillar that must be 
addressed (De Buysere et al. 2012), so that appropriate rules and mea-
sures are put in place while ensuring the necessary protection of those 
interested in engaging in crowdfunding (Bruntje and Gajda 2016).
While economic theory suggests that a truly integrated market would 
reduce disparities considerably, local and regional differences can still 
occur. In an integrated market, platforms could offer their services across 
borders, investments would flow to the platform with the best offers, 
while allowing successful platforms to scale and outperform competitors. 
However, the motivation of local investors to provide funds to local busi-
nesses on local platforms might be higher than investing in businesses 
residing abroad or platforms abroad, even if both domestic and foreign 
platforms offer the same or better investment protections and services. 
Such phenomenon is known from investment research as a home bias 
(Tesar and Werner 1995), as well as ‘not invented here’ attitudes towards 
foreign ideas and technologies (Antons and Piller 2014).
Non-investment crowdfunding models such as those employed by 
donation- and reward-based platforms are the least constrained in terms 
of regulation. Platforms like Kickstarter, Indiegogo, Global Giving or 
GoFundMe, based in the US, have localized the user experience by trans-
lating the website into local languages, while operating under their 
respective international brands (Skotte and Juvik 2019). Donation- and 
reward-based crowdfunding does not require platforms to be supervised 
by the financial authorities or comply with investor protection regulation 
to the extent investment platforms are required to do. Platforms in 
donation- based and reward-based crowdfunding have to adhere to rules 
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in the area of digital payments, but they partner with a payment provider 
which ensures regulatory compliance with European laws. There are very 
few exceptions where donation collection requires special permits such as 
in Denmark and Finland, but in most other European markets require-
ments are more flexible. Reward-based crowdfunding platforms have to 
comply with other European legal frameworks, such as the e-Commerce 
directive, Consumer rights directive, Copyright directive, or the Platform 
directive, which is currently under discussion. And although these direc-
tives have not been uniformly implemented across the European Union, 
such regulations haven’t prohibited non-investment platforms to scale 
across Europe.
Most concerns with regulatory fragmentation are associated with 
investment crowdfunding. Here, the MiFID (2004/39/EC)    and 
MiFID II (2014/65/EU) (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) 
(European Commission 2018b) should have provided a unified frame-
work for crowdfunding intermediaries. However, platforms and their 
industry associations provided evidence in the Impact Assessment of the 
European Commission that the MiFID-framework  is not suitable to 
their business models. Member states have in the past ‘gold-plated’ 
MiFID by adding additional provisions for consumer protection, which 
made operation of platforms across border an even more demanding, 
costly, and less efficient process.
A second symptom of a regulatory fragmentation is the different 
national regimes under which platforms operate. A few member states of 
the European Union have implemented a bespoke regime for alternative 
finance service providers (e.g. UK, Finland, France), however, in most 
European member states a bespoke regime is still lacking, which gener-
ates regulatory uncertainty of platforms operating across borders. 
Furthermore, differences in national regulations across Europe have been 
argued to not only result in distortions of the market playing fields, but 
also limit economic growth that can be supported by cross-border offers 
of crowdfunding (Gajda 2017). In this context the CCAF report showed 
a clear positive association between crowdfunding volumes per capita and 
the level to which platforms evaluated local regulations as adequate 
(Ziegler et al. 2019). Overall, differences in regulatory regimes stem from 
disparities in licensing requirements, thresholds for prospectus require-
ments, as well as various consumer and investor protection provisions.
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Third, regulatory fragmentation can also be a result of activities of 
market participants. Platforms have created self-regulation frameworks, 
which are designed to induce trust in domestic platforms and possibly to 
establish a market entry barrier for foreign platforms. However, even self- 
regulation documents as enshrined in codes of conduct and ethics 
adopted by various industry organization across Europe exhibit signifi-
cant differences in terms of scope, ambition, and oversight (Odorović and 
Wenzlaff 2020).
Against this backdrop, the European Union initiated the process 
towards establishing a pan-European regulatory regime in March 2018. 
The European Commission’s FinTech Action Plan (European Commission 
2018a) explicitly envisaged such goal as part of the European Capital 
Markets Union. More specifically, the ECSP Regime (European 
Commission 2018c) aimed to close the disparity in national regulations, 
provide robust investor protection, enable platforms to cater to clients in 
different countries holding a single licence, and allow small and innova-
tive firms to raise funds across borders more effectively. Under such 
approach, the need to scale up regulatory compliance left limited room 
for opt-out provisions and partial harmonization in the case of the 
ECSP Regime.
The European Commission, in its proposal, suggested a passporting 
regime, similar to the existing MiFID regime for the offering and trading 
of equity and debt. The Commission proposal prohibited individual 
member states from adding regulatory requirements for platforms autho-
rized as European Crowdfunding Service Providers. Such a prohibition 
would have created a level playing field between platforms operating in 
different states. It would also have curtailed regulatory arbitrage. However, 
in order to anticipate objection as a compromise with the Council, the 
Commission’s proposal also allowed for the coexistence of national regu-
latory regimes. Accordingly, platforms wishing to stay within their respec-
tive existing regime, or operate only in one country, could stay within 
these national regulatory frameworks. The proposal by the Parliament 
sided with the Proposal by the Commission. The Council proposal went 
a different way. The Council instead proposed a harmonized regime with 
minimum standards, with member states having the option to increase 
the requirements on platforms operating in their countries.
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The proposed regulation by the Commission foresaw several unique 
solutions to the regulatory dilemma of harmonizing without stifling 
innovation. At the same time, the proposal left a few pertaining issues 
subject to further debate. The European Commission embraced the view 
that the regulation should focus more on the status and behaviour of 
crowdfunding intermediaries rather than fundraising firms. Despite sub-
stantially differing risk profiles, the proposal incorporated both lending- 
based crowdfunding for businesses (known as P2P business lending) and 
equity-based crowdfunding. The blurry line of distinction between some 
debt and equity instruments justified equal regulatory treatment. 
However, P2P consumer lending remained outside the scope of the pro-
posed regulation, although the business model of P2P consumer lending 
is more similar to P2P business lending than to equity-based crowdfund-
ing, and despite the fact that some entrepreneurs took P2P consumer 
loans to fund their small business ventures.
The critical aspect of investor protection under the proposed regula-
tion is a high level of transparency at the platform and the project levels. 
Transparency rules serve to attenuate information asymmetry inherent in 
all financial markets. Investors have imperfect information about both 
the quality of projects seeking funding and the quality of platforms’ ser-
vices. Therefore, the regulation sets out distinctive transparency rules for 
project owners and platforms. Here, instead of costly prospectus require-
ments, project owners have to provide investors with a simplified key 
investor information sheet to enable them to make sound and informed 
investment decisions. In this context, another crucial discussion revolves 
around what should be the investment threshold that triggers the exemp-
tion from prospectus requirements. The European Commission proposed 
a threshold of 1 million euro per project per year. The European 
Parliament proposed a threshold of 8 million euro per year. The Council 
allowed member states to set the threshold between 1 million euro and 8 
million euro per year. The negotiation concluded by setting a limit at 5 
million euro per year and project.
With respect to prospective investors, the European Commission was 
concerned that retail investors do not understand the nature of crowd-
funding investments and the risks they entail. For this reason, the regula-
tion foresees an ‘appropriateness test’ (a concept also known under 
MiFID (II)) to be a part of the investors’ onboarding procedure. Such a 
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solution is an attempt to circumvent a more burdensome ‘suitability test’, 
which would imply that a platform estimates the financial situation of its 
clients and their ability to bear losses associated with crowdfunding 
investments.
Several provisions of the regulation referred to business requirements 
for platforms to ensure, among others, the impartiality before and conti-
nuity of business after the completion of a campaign. Given that plat-
forms do not take any risk on their balance sheet, the European 
Commission deemed capital requirements redundant in case of crowd-
funding, thus, leading to a sizable reduction of costs of market entry. The 
Council Proposal foresaw minimum operating capital, primarily to pro-
vide a continuation of the platform business in case of insolvency. In the 
end, the negotiation concluded with a minimum capital requirement of 
25,000 euro.
At the time of writing this chapter, technical details were still emerg-
ing, all supporting the underlying notion that the ECSP will lead to a 
reduction of fragmentation. As a regulation (not a directive), it will be 
valid in all European member states 12 months after it is passed by the 
Council, Parliament, and Commission, with the option for each member 
state to extend the 12 month grace period to 24 months. It provides a 
unified definition of investment crowdfunding and of crowdfunding ser-
vice providers. The ECSP regime sets a unified threshold for prospectus 
requirements at 5 million euro per year and per project. It also stipulates 
that member states cannot set forth individual investor thresholds.
The ECSP will be especially relevant for lending platforms, because it 
prohibits member states from requiring a banking licence from lendees or 
lenders, which will enable new platforms to merge. The conduct of plat-
forms is regulated uniformly across European Union member states, 
especially in areas of regulatory uncertainty concerning the management 
of conflict of interest and relations with investors.
Finally, while of great benefit in reducing disparities with respect to 
investment crowdfunding across Europe, the ECSP will have little effect 
on P2P consumer lending, as well as on non-investment crowdfunding 
models, as they are not covered in the proposed regulation (Hooghiemstra 
2019). In addition, a remaining loophole may result in that even in cases 
of investment crowdfunding for businesses, not all platforms will be cov-
ered in situations where member states decide that certain financial 
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instruments are not deemed as securities, which are covered by the 
ECSP. Moreover, other critical regulatory aspects related to crowdfund-
ing practice are also not covered by this regulation. For example, in terms 
of taxation, some European countries offer tax incentive schemes to 
investors and companies using crowdfunding (e.g. UK, France, Italy, 
Belgium, and Spain), while other countries do not, and even among 
those offering incentives, such schemes vary widely (Cicchiello et al. 2019).
 Outcomes of Crowdfunding in Europe
Due to both sensitivity of information and the relative recency of the 
phenomenon, only limited evidence from a few studies is available about 
the outcomes of crowdfunding in European countries. Here, a study 
examining P2P loans in Lithuania from the Finbee P2P consumer lend-
ing platform (Gaigalienė and Česnys 2018) showed a default rate (defined 
as loan payment more than 90 days late) of 13% in a sample of 6324 
loans analysed.
A different study examining 413 equity funded firms in Germany and 
the UK (Hornuf et al. 2018) found that overall 77 firms (18.8%) success-
fully raised follow-up funding after the latest equity crowdfunding cam-
paign, and 69 firms (16.7%) went insolvent, were liquidated, or were 
dissolved. Furthermore, the study showed that, in comparison to UK 
firms, equity crowdfunded German firms stood a higher chance of raising 
follow-up funding from business angels or venture capital, but also had a 
higher likelihood of failure.
 Conclusions
This chapter has presented evidence on the fragmented nature of European 
crowdfunding with respect to volumes, number of platforms, model 
composition and leadership, involvement of traditional financial institu-
tions, dependency levels on cross-border transactions, and state of national 
regulation. However, while fragmentation in the European crowdfunding 
market was high in previous years, such disparities are expected to decrease 
with harmonized regulation and a boost in cross- border developments. 
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The new rules laid out by the ECSP Regime hold promise to reduce frag-
mentation further, benefitting both large and small platforms towards 
healthier scale up supported by expansion to other European countries. 
Fragmentation in non-investment crowdfunding will likely continue, 
because of its exclusion from the ECSP  regime, as well as the locally 
anchored nature of most of the small-scale fundraising initiatives charac-
terizing non-investment models.
 Implications for Future Research
While our review presents interesting insights about current realities in 
the European crowdfunding market, it also opens up opportunities for 
future research. Most importantly, there is the need for longitudinal 
study of market development dynamics, attempting to identify whether 
harmonization of regulation will indeed limit the extent to which the 
market is fragmented, as well as to what extent it will contribute to the 
international expansion of crowdfunding platforms across Europe. Other 
aspects in this context may relate to the study of the impact international 
platforms may have on local platforms, as international scope of invest-
ment may be more appealing to prospective fundraisers.
It will also be interesting to research the impact of clear and harmo-
nized regulation on moves by traditional financial institutions, examin-
ing whether this will encourage them to enter the crowdfunding space 
and under which organizational and ownership formats. In this respect, 
it remains to be seen whether crowdfunding will deliver on its ideological 
promises of democratization of finance, or whether it will be overtaken 
by traditional actors with deeper pockets. This is especially relevant in 
mainland Europe, which has a long tradition of reliance on the banking 
system that can be used to  enhance the  legitimacy and credibility of 
crowdfunding actors among the general public.
In addition, more research is necessary on the outcomes of crowdfund-
ing in the European context, capturing its short- and long-term effects on 
businesses, entrepreneurs, and investors. Such research remains rare and 
anecdotal, but of tremendous value for future platform development, 
policy making, and investor behaviour.
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 Implications for Practice
First, investment crowdfunding platforms should follow the entry into 
force  of the ECSP  regulation in their respective countries, as well as 
countries they may wish to expand to, and adjust their operations accord-
ingly. This implies developing strategies both for facing new competitors 
from neighbouring countries entering the platforms’ home markets, as 
well as market entry strategies for countries they may wish to enter into 
themselves. Such strategies may include strategic partnerships, joint ven-
turing, as well as platform mergers across Europe.
Second, once the greatest regulatory barriers have been addressed, plat-
forms should focus attention on improving public education and under-
standing of crowdfunding to support its uptake in the various markets. 
Regulatory ambiguity may have been detrimental for participation in this 
market, and with such clarity platforms should engage in more strategic 
customer relationship management in terms of both retaining existing 
users, as well as recruiting new ones.
Finally, with greater regulatory clarity, opportunities for collaboration 
between traditional and alternative finance players are likely to increase. 
Here, platform operators should strike a delicate balance between being 
overpowered by deep pocket institutions that may want a stake in this 
new fast developing market, while remaining loyal to the original driving 
forces behind the market in terms of expanding access to finance, and 
greater sharing of profits with the wider public.
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